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SN SOME of its public statements in recent years,
the FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) has
stressed the objective of promoting market discipline
ofthe risksassumed bybanks through the influence of
uninsured depositors.’ The FDIC has attempted to
accomplish this by allowing theuninsured depositors
of some failed banks to suffer losses. In practice, the
cases in which uninsured depositors have been ex-
posed to losses involve relatively small banks - As a
consequence, the managers of some relatively small
banks claim that they have lost large-denomination
deposit accounts to larger banks as large depositors
reduce the risk of losing part of their deposits by
moving their accounts to relatively large banks.’
This paper investigates whether the FDICs actions
in recent years indicate a double standard in the
treatment oflargedepositors at largeand small banks.
Next,the paper analyzesthe effectsthat such a double
standard would have on the operation ofthe banking
system. Finally, it investigates whether depositors
nowact as thoughthey perceivean increase in therisk
of holding large-denomination deposits at small
banks overholding them at largebanks.
R. Mon Gilbert is an assistant vice president atthe Federal Reserve
Bankof St. Louis. Laura A. Prives provided research assistance.
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This section presents a brief description of the
FDIC’s procedures in disposing of the assets and de-
posit liabilities ofinsured banks that fail -A knowledge
of these procedures is necessary to understand the
effect of recent FDICactions on the risks assumed by
largedepositors at banks of different size.
A commercial bank is officially declared a failed
bankbyitschartering agency — the Comptroller ofthe
Currency for a national bank, the state banking au-
thority for a state-chartered bank. The FDIC becomes
the receiver ofa federally insured bank that fails,with
authority to dispose of the assets and to pay off the
creditors.
One type ofaction the FDIC can take as receiver of a
failedbank is called a deposit payoff. The FDIC makes
payments to each depositor, up to the insurance limit,
as soon as the records of deposit accounts can be
compiled. Depositors with accounts over the insur-
ance limitbecome general creditors ofthe failed bank
for the amount of their deposits in excess of the
insurance limit. They receive payments on the unin-
suredportions oftheir deposits as the FDICliquidates
the assets of the failed bank. Whether theyreceive full
payment on their uninsured deposits depends on the
liquidation value of these assets.For the FDIC, there are disadvantages to handling
the receivership of a failed bank through a deposit
payoff. Banking services are temporarily disrupted,
even for the fully insured depositors, who generally
must wait a few days to receive their funds. For the
uninsured depositors, even if they eventually receive
full payment, the delay can throw a wrench into the
financing oftheir activities.Also, the acquisition ofthe
failed bank’s assets may be more valuable to another
bank than to the FDIC, especially if the other bank
could continue to operate the failed bank as a going
concern.
The FDIC prefers to handle most bankfailure cases
through what are called purchase and assumption
IP&Al transactions. In these transactions, allofafailed
bank’s depositliabilities are assumed by anotherbank,
which also purchases some ofthe failed bank’s assets.
The FDICinitiates aP&A transaction by soliciting bids
from other banks for the purchase of assets and the
assumption of deposit liabilities of a failed bank. The
FDIC specifies that an interested bank must assume
all deposit liabilities and acquire assets considered to
be ofgood value Ii.e., excluding loans and debt instru-
ments that are not likely to be paid in full). Additional
cash will be provided by the FDIC if the value of the
assets of the failed bank offered for purchase is less
than the deposit liabilities to be assumed. Banks that
are interested in such a package of assets and liabili-
ties bid for it in terms of a purchase premium. The
actual cash payment from the FDICequals the liabili-
ties of thefailed bank, minus the value of the assets of
the failed bank purchased by the bank with the win-
ningbid, less the purchase premium bid by that bank.
In deciding between a deposit payoff or a P&A
transaction, the FDIC uses a cost test. It estimates its
cost under both a deposit payoffand a P&A transac-
tion, based on the bid of the highest purchase pre-
mium. The FDIC generally will accept the highest bid
for the P&Atransaction ifits net cost is lower thanthe
estimated costs of a deposit payoff. These estimates
are not very precise, and the FDIC has tended to use
the P&A method except in situations in which:
1. there is virtually no interest by other banks in
acquiring the failed bank, or
2. fraudor othercircumstances, such as contingent
liabilities,make itdifficult to estimate lossesand,
therefore, toapply the cost test.’
In choosing between a deposit payoff and a P&A
transaction, the FDIC has had to decide which of the
following objectives it would give the greatest weight:
1. to avoid disruption of banking services, or
2. to promote market discipline by uninsured de-
positors of the risks assumed by banks.
Ifthe FDICtends to handle bank failure cases through
deposit payoffs, uninsured depositors must assume
the risk of losses if their banks fail. In response, the
uninsured depositors might put pressure on their
banks to limit risk. But deposit payoffs, as we have
seen, disrupt banking services.
The use ofP&A transactions prevents disruptions of
banking services. This alternative, however, may give
uninsured depositors the impressionthat they are not
exposed to risk of loss when their banks fail. As a
consequence, they would not attempt to restrain the
risks assumed by theirbanks.
To avoid the limitations of both procedures, the
FDICannounced, in December1983, that it would use
a new procedure for disposing of assets and deposit
liabilities in some bank failure cases. The new “mod-
ifiedpayout procedure” was adopted to give the FDIC
more flexibility in minimizing disruption of banking
services, while exposing uninsured depositors to the
risk oflosses on their deposits.’
When a bank failure is handled through the mod-
ifiedpayout procedure, the FDICmakes fullpayments
to the insured depositors and partial payments to the
large depositors on the uninsured portions of their
deposits; the partial payments are based on an FOIC
estimate of the proceeds from the liquidation of the
assets of the failed bank. If recoveries on the assets
eventually exceed the initial estimate, the uninsured
depositors receive additional payments; if the pro-
ceeds from liquidating those assets fall short of the
initialpayment, the FDIC absorbs the loss. The partial
payment disrupts the activities of uninsured deposi-
tors less than the traditional deposit payoff did.
In some cases handled under the modified payout
procedure, the insured liabilities of a failed bank are
assumed by anotherbank. Thisarrangement prevents
a disruption of banking services for depositors with
full federal insurance. The procedures for arranging
this deposit assumption are similarto the procedures
inatraditional P&A transaction. The FDIC solicitsbids
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for the purchase of some of the assets of the failed
bank and the assumption ofthe fully insured deposit
liabilities. The FDIC provides cash to cover a gap
between the value of assets purchased and the fully
insured deposit liabilities assumed, minus any pur-
chase premium. The FDIC then receives the remain-
ing assets and makes a partial payment to the unin-
sured depositors. This approach to handling bank
failurecases hassimilarities toboth the deposit payoff
and P&A transaction procedures.
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The official limit on deposit insurance coverage,
currently the first $100,000 for each depositor at each
depository institution, is thesame forinsured banks of
all sizes. There is circumstantial evidence, however,
that the FDIC provides large depositors at a fewof the
nation’s largest banks greater protection from loss
than large depositors at smaller banks. There is no
officialstatement ofthis double standard by the FDIC;
if it exists, it must be inferred from the FDIC’s actions
in bankfailure cases.
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Until 1982, everybank failure involving assets greater
than $100 million had been handled through P&A
transactions, thus protecting the uninsured deposi-
tors from any losses.’ From 1968, when the FDIC
adopted its current procedures for P&A transactions,
through 1981, only 32 of the 108 bank failure cases
were handled through deposit payoffs. These 32
banks, which had average total assets of $10.4 million,
had relatively few deposit accounts in excess of the
insurance limit. The other 76 had average total assets
of $171 million. These FDIC actions could have con-
vinced most large depositors that, in effect, they had
complete insurance coverage of their deposit ac-
counts, even if their accounts exceeded the officially
stated insurance limit.
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In the early 1980s, the FDIC became concerned
1Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1984), p. 93.
°tbid.,table 4-2, p. 65.
about a lack of market discipline imposed by large
depositors on the risks assumed by their banks. This
concernwas stimulated by theview that various forms
of deregulation gave bankers greater freedom to as-
sume more risk.’
The response ofthe FDIC to the failure of the Penn
Square Bank of Oklahoma City in 1982 reflected, in
part, an intention to increase the degree of market
discipline by large depositors. The FDIC closed the
Penn Square Bank, which had total assets of $517
million, and paid offeach depositor up to the federal
insurance limit.
A recent history of the FDIC mentions two reasons
for closing the Penn Square Bank and paying off the
depositors, rather than protecting the uninsured de-
positors through a P&A transaction. First, it was not
possible at that time for the FDIC to determine the
costs of alternative methods of handling the case.
Second, the FDIC was concerned that, if the large
depositors of the Penn Square Bank were protected
from losses, market discipline ofthe risksassumed by
banks through the influence oflargedepositors would
be eroded. The FDIC concluded that paying off the
depositors of the Penn Square Bank, up to the insur-
ance limit, and allowing the uninsured depositors to
suffer losses, would cause investors to perceive a
greater risk in holding large-denomination deposits.8
The handling of the Penn Square case indicated
that, in order to promote market discipline by large
depositors, the FDIC was willing to apply the deposit
payoff procedure in the failure of a much larger bank
than it had in the past. This case did not reveal,
however, whether the FDIC would put a limit on the
size of a failed bankthat would be handled through a
deposit payoff. Thus, the FDIC’s actions in this case
did not indicate whether the risks of holding large
deposit accounts had risen more for those with ac-
counts at small banks or large banks.
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The next major action by the FDIC to induce unin-
sureddepositors torestrain the risksassumed by their
banks was the adoption ofthemodified payoutproce-
dure. As mentioned above, an important objective for
adopting this procedure was to expose uninsured
‘This concern about a tack of market discipline is expressed in
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1983).
‘FederalDeposit Insurance Corporation (1984), pp. 97—98.
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depositors to some riskofloss iftheirbanks fail, while
minimizing the disruption to banking services.
The first bank failures handled under the modified
payout procedure occurred in March 1984. From
March through May 1984, the FDIC used the new
modified payoutprocedure in nine bank failurecases.
In two of those cases, the banks were closed and the
FDIC made payments to all depositors. The only dif-
ference between these two cases and the usual de-
posit payoff case was that the uninsured depositors
received partial payments when their banks were
closed, instead of receiving any payments after the
FDICliquidated the assets.
In the other seven cases handled under the mod-
ified payout procedure, otherbanks assumed the fully
insured deposit liabilities of the failed banks and pur-
chased some of their assets. Since other banks were
interested in bidding for the assets and fully insured
deposit liabilities of the~e seven banks, it is likely that
theiruninsured depositórs would also havebeen pro-
tected from losses through P&A transactions if the
FDIC had not adopted the modified payout proce-
dure.
All of the seven bank failure cases handled under
the modified payout procedure, with assumption of
fully insured deposit liabilities by other banks, in-
volved relatively small banks. The total deposits of
those seven banks ranged from $16 million to $116
million, with a mean of $54 million. Their uninsured
deposits on average were $1.6 million.
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The rapid withdrawal of foreign deposits from the
Continental Illinois National Bank, Chicago, created a
financial crisis for that bank in May 1984. The FDIC,
the Federal Reserve, and the Comptroller of the Cur-
rency became concerned about the effects that the
failure ofContinental would have on other depository
institutions and economic activity in general. These
agencies issued a joint news release on May 17, 1984,
that described a program of assistance for Continen-
tal. That joint news release includes the following
statement:
In view of all the circumstances surrounding Conti-
nental IllinoisBank, the FDIC provides assurance that,
in any arrangements that may be necessary to achieve
apermanent solution, all depositors and othergeneral
creditors of the bank will be fully protected and ser-
vices to the bank’s customers will not be interrupted.
This statement indicates that, although the FDIC
wishes to induce large depositors to restrain the risks
assumed by theirbanks, there is an upper limit on the
size of banks at which large depositors are subject to
losses.
From June 1984 through May 1985, the FUIC han-
dled six more bank failure cases by arranging for the
assumption of the fully insured deposit liabilities by
other banks, but limiting payments on uninsured de-
posits to the proceeds from liquidating the assets of
the failed banks. Total deposits of those six banks
range between $4 million and $46 million (a mean of




The actions of the FDIC since mid-1982 reveal the
following pattern: To promote market discipline by
large depositors, the FDIC is willing to close a failing
bank with total assets as large as $500 million. In
practice, the modified payout procedure, which was
adoptedto promote market discipline by largedeposi-
tors, has been used in the failure of a few relatively
small banks. Banks as large as Continental Illinois
appear to be exempt from this policy. This combina-
tion of FDIC actions may imply that the riskofholding
depositsin an account that exceeds the federalinsur-
ance limit has increased in recent years, unless that
account is at one ofthe largest banks in the nation.
If large depositors think they are protected from
losses by holding their funds at relatively large banks,
they will have no incentive to monitor the risks as-
sumed by these banks or to put pressure on the
management of these banks to restrain risks. Thus, by
protecting depositors at relatively large banks from
losses, the FDIC may have reduced the restraints on
risks assumed by relatively large banks.
Actions that favor uninsured depositors at relatively
large banks also may have implications for trends in
the nation’s banking structure. The share of the na-
tion’s banking assets at a few of the relatively large
banks may riseovertime, as largedepositors shift their
funds to the relatively large banks to reduce risks.
‘In some of these six cases, the large depositors did not receive
partial payments when the banks tailed, because it was difficult for
the FDIC to estimate recovery on the assets it assumed.444.,’ 9~ 4/’) .:34,. “C JUNEJJLR,Y 1985
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Before concluding that the recent actions of the
FDIC in bank failure cases have the implications for
the banking system discussed above, one must deter-
mine whether depositors have responded to what
appears to be differential treatment oflarge and small
banks. There are various reasons why the events de-
scribed above might not affect the behavior of unin-
sured depositors. Large depositors may have believed
for some time that the FDIC would not allow a bank
the size of Continental Illinois to fail. The FDIC had
acted in the past to prevent the failure of relatively
large banks with total assets smaller than those of
Continental.” Thus, the announcement ofthe deposit
guaranteefor Continental in May 1984may havecome
as no surprise.
Alternatively, holders of uninsured deposits may
continue to have confidence in their own banks de-
spite the increased risk of keeping their accounts at
small banks. Or, they might not be aware of the impli-
cations of FDIC actions in recent bank failure cases.
There are two potential pieces of evidence that
would support the view that depositors consider the
risk of holding uninsured deposits at small banks to
have risen relative to the risk of holding deposits of
similar size at large banks. First, interest rates that
small banks offer to attract large-denomination de-
posits must rise relativeto the interest rates offered by
largebanks. Second,the share oftotaltime depositsat
allcommercial banks inaccounts abovethe insurance
limitmust rise at relatively largebanks and decline at
small banks, as depositors shift their large-denomina-
tion deposit accounts to relatively largebanks. Both of
these patterns would have to begin after mid-May
1984, when the FDIC announced the deposit guaran-
tee of Continental Illinois Bank.
Data on the interest rates paid on large-
denomination time deposits are not available forrela-
tively small banks. Consequently, the observations are
limited to those for the allocation of large time de-
posits among large and small banks.
‘°5~e the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (1984), pp. 89—97.
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There is no official list of banks that are too large to
fail. As an approximation to the group of banks that
may have such status, this paper uses the 30 largest
banks in the nation.” Small banks are identified as
those smaller than weekly reporting banks (which
include all commercial banks with total assets of$1.4
billion ormore as of December 31, 1982).
Chart I does not indicate a sustained pattern of
decline in the share of large-denomination time de-
posits at smallbanks or arise in the share at relatively
large banks after mid-May 1984. The share of large-
denomination time deposits at the small banks did
declinefrom almost 40 percent in thefirst week of May
1984 to about 37 percent in the last weekin June oflast
year. That change might reflect an initial response by
depositors to the handling of the Continental Illinois
situation by the FDIC. In contrast, that decline might
reflect a seasonal pattern; the share of large-
denomination time deposits at small banks declined
between the same weeks in 1982. whatever the cause
of that dip, it was more than reversed by October of
lastyear, and the share oflarge timedeposits at small
banks continued to rise through May 1985. The share
of large-denomination deposits at small banks de-
clinedin June 1985, asit had inJune of1982 and1984.”
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Observations in chart I may suffer from several
measurement problems. First, the banks with total
assets just below $1.4 billion are included together
with much smaller banks. A finerbreakdown ofbanks
by asset size may be necessary to detect an outflow of
large-denomination time deposits from small banks.
Second, some of the time deposits in denomina-
tions of $100,000 or more are in accounts of exactly
“In September 1984, the Comptroller of the Currency, C.T. Conover,
was reported in the press as saying that thefederal regulators would
not allow the largest 11 banks to fail; later, however, he denied
stating any cut-off figure for banks too large to fail. See Trigaux
(1984).
“The patterns in chart 1 reflect differential effects of the authorization
of money marlet deposit accounts (MMDA5) at large and small
banks. Largetime deposits at all commercial banks declined sharply
after the announcement that MMDAs would be available in mid-
December 1982. These deposits had peaked in October 1982, but
by May 1983, had declined by about $50 billion. During the same
period, large time deposits at small banks rose by about $13 billion.
Thus, the small banks do not seem to have been affected by the
substitution between large-denomination deposits and MMDAs in
thesame way asthe larger banks.
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Chart I
Share of Large-Denomination Time Deposits
at Large and Small Banks
Percent
100
1982 1983 1984 1985
NOTE, Large time deposits ore in denominations of $100,000 or more. Large banks are the weekly reporting banks,
and small banks ore below the size of weekly reporters. The top 30 banks are the largest commercial banks,
in total assets, as of December 1984,






$100,000, and, therefore, are fully insured. Thus, the
percentage of time deposits in denominations of
$100,000 or more overstates the percentage of time
deposits inaccounts that are only partially insured.
The third possible measurement problem is that
many of the small banks are subsidiaries of large
banking organizations. Uninsured depositors may be
less concerned about possible losses of theirdeposits
at a relatively small bank if it is a subsidiary of a large
banking organization.
The relevance ofthese possible measurement prob-
lemscan be investigated with data from the Report of
Condition of each commercial bank. Table I presents
the percentage of large-denomination time deposits
in the banking system at groups of relatively small
banks in various size categories. To eliminate banks
that are subsidiaries ofrelatively largebanking organi-
zations, the banks in table I are in organizations with
total banking assets less than $1 billion.
The issue of which large-denomination time de-
posits are only partially insured is more difficult to
settle. In attempting to exclude time deposits in de-
nominations of$100,000or morethat are fullyinsured,
the best approach available withthe existing data is to
exclude from the calculations those banks with brok-
ered deposits in denominations of $100,000 or less,
which are called “retail brokered deposits.” Deposit
brokers typically break down the funds they place at
an individual bank into units of $100,000 or less for
theirindividual investors, so that the deposits of each
investor are fullyinsured. The banks with retail brok-
ered deposits, therefore, are the ones likelyto have the










Percentage of Large-Denomination Time Deposits in Various Size Banks1
1984 1985
&—i~ ‘.zecategoiy Number .~.. — . ——
‘millions ofdollars) - of banks March - June September December March
Under$1O 422 0.14% 0.15% 0.16% 017% 019%
S10to25 1.450 1.13 1.14 1.18 1.21 133
.S25 to 50 1.464 2.60 2.58 2 64 2 66 2.89
$50 to 100 966 3.94 3.89 3.95 3.93 4.28
$100 to 300 584 5.63 5.63 5.80 5.79 611
$300 to 500 93 2.37 2.38 2 46 2.45 2 50
$500101 000 60 2.33 2.36 240 253 2.59
Total 5.039 18,14 18.13 62 1834 19.89
‘The same banks are included In each size group as of each of the five Report of ond,tion dates As of each date, these banks reported no
retail brokered deposits These banks are assigned to lhe same size group asof each date, basedon their total assets asof March 1984.
For banks in each group. the sum of their time deposits in denominations of $100,000 or more are calculated as percentages of
large-denomination lime deposits as of the same date at all commercial banks that reported no retail brakereddeposits
Table 2 provides indirect evidence on the extent to
which the time deposits in denominations of $100,000
or more exceed the insurance limit at banks with no
retail brokered deposits. l’he FDIC collected data
through June 1981 on various types of deposit ac-
counts that exceeded the insurance limit. As of June
1981, the percentages of time deposits in denomina-
tions of$100,000 ormore are only slightlyhigher than
the percentages in accounts that exceeded the insur-
ance limit. Thus, as of June 1981, very high percent-
ages of timedeposits in denominations of $100,000 or
more were only partially insured. Also, for banks of
comparable size, the percentages of time deposits in
denominations of $100,000 or more in June 1984 are
similar to the percentages in June 1981. These com-
parisons of observations in table 2 provide a basis for
concluding that highpercentages ofthe timedeposits
in denominations of $100,000 or more, asofJune 1984,
were only partially insured. Data are not available,
however, to provide direct evidence on this issue.
Data on retail brokered deposits for all federally
insured commercial banks are not available before
March 1984. Beginning with the quarterly Report of
Condition in March 1984, each bank reports the total
dollar amount of all brokered deposits and of retail
brokered deposits. Databased on the Report of Condi-
tion, therefore, are limited to the period since March
1984.
The purpose ofthe calculations presented in table I
is to determine whether banks in various size groups
have increased or decreased their share of large-
denomination time deposits in the banking system.
Banks in each of the size groups have the following
characteristics: First,each bank filed a Report of Con-
dition on all five dates. Second, eachbank reported no
retail brokered deposits on each date. Third, each
bank is assigned to one size class for all five dates,
based on its total assets as of March 1984. Thus, each
size group includes the same banks for each of the
Report of Condition dates.
The numerator of each percentage in table I is the
sum of time deposits in denominations of $100,000 or
more for a given group of banks, as of a Report of
Condition date. The denominator is the sum of large-
denomination time deposits ofall commercial banks
as of the same date, excluding those banks that re-
ported retail brokered deposits.
As of March 1984, these 5,039 banks accounted for
about 18 percent of large-denomination time deposits
ofthe banking system. By March 1985, that percentage
rose to almost 20 percent, and the share of large-
denomination timedeposits rose for each ofthe seven
groups of banks. Thus, the evidence in chart 1 and
table I are consistent: theshare oflarge-denomination
time deposits at relatively small banks is higher in
early 1985 than a year earlier, before the announce-
ment of the federal guarantee of all deposit liabilities
at the Continental Illinois bank.
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Table 2
Average Percentages of Time Deposits in
Large-Denomination Accounts
Percentage of
Bank size time deposits Percentage oftime deposits
category in accounts in accounts of
(millions of larger than $100,000 or more dollars of $100,000, ... .. -. .. -- total deposits) June1981’ June 1981 June 19842
Under$10 14.9% 17.2% 21.1%
$10to25 16.9 18.2 20.8
$25 to 50 204 21.4 22.7
$50 to 100 25.6 26.9 266
$lOOtoSOO 34.8 373 341
$500 to 1,000 43.2 46 6 36.7
‘The numerators and denominators of these percentages include time deposits of individuals.
partnerships and corporations and public funds invested in time and savings deposits at commercial
banks.
aanks included in the calculations for June 1984 have no retail brokered deposits: they are in banking
organizations with total banking assets less than $1 billion.
tors havenot shiftedtheir accountsfrom smallto large
banks since theannouncement ofthe FDIC guarantee
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation FDIC) of all deposit liabilities of Continental tllinois.
has been putting greater emphasis in recent years on
increasing the incentives for large depositors to re-
strain the risks assumed by their banks, by allowing
the uninsured depositors of some failed banks to
suffer losses. FDIC actions designed to promote mar-
ket discipline by large depositors, however, have af-
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. Deposit Insurance in a
fectedpnmanly relatively smallbanks. In contrast, the Changing Environment” in A Report to Congress on Federal De-
FDIC guarantee ofall deposit liabilities of the Conti- posit Insurance(April1983).
nental Illinois National Bank in May of last year mdi- ________ . The First Fifty Years: A Historyofthe FDIC, 1933—1983
cates that the large depositors of a few of the nation’s (Washington, D.C., 1984).
largest banks may have no risk of losses if their banks Hill, C. Christianand Edwin A.Finn. “ConfidenceCrisis: Big Deposi-
experience large reductions in the value of their ~ Beleaguered Banks Speed the Failure Rate,” Wall
assets.
Isaac, William M. Address beforethe Management Conference of
This contrast in treatment of large and small banks the National Council of SavingsInstitutions, New York, December
might be expected to induce large depositors to shift 6, 1983.
their accounts to a few of the nation’s largest banks. King, A. j “Treat 5m~Banks, Continental Similarly,” American
The data available to test this hypothesis have some
Trigaux, Robert. “Comptroller Trying to Dispel Reports of ‘Guaran-
limitations. The most appropriate conclusion, given tees’ for Top Ii Banks Only,” American Banker (September 28,
the nature of the data, however, is that large deposi- 1984), p.3.